A personal diary - Part 1: Prologue and March 2010
A personal diary - Part 2: 1. - 17. April 2010
The Red Shirt protests - Part 3: 18. - 20. April 2010 - the barricade and the arrival of the security forces
The Red Shirt protests - Part 4: 21. - 30. April 2010 - Mob Rules
Die Rothemden-Proteste - Teil 5: 01. - 14. Mai - grausamer Mai/ "Cruel May" - พฤษภาอำมหิต- Teil/Part 1 - (German Version, only English captions and some English text translations)
The Red Shirt protests - Part 6: 15. - 18. Mai - "Cruel May" - พฤษภาอำมหิต - Part 2
The Red Shirt Protests - Part 7: May 19 - the crackdown
The Red Shirt protests - Part 8: 21. May 2010 - after the crackdown
Only partly English Version
(Only a few English text translations, headlines and captions on this site, SORRY)
"Der Grausame Mai" - พฤษภาอำมหิต - Teil 1
"Cruel May" - พฤษภาอำมหิต - Part 1
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01. - 10. Mai/May
Ein Kompromiss, Strassensperren und der Versuch einer Stromsperre
A Compromise, Roadblocks and a failed attempt of a Power Cut
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| Nachtwache an der Barrikade Sala Daeng. Night watch at Sala Daeng barricade. |
Am 24. April verhandelte die Regierung erneut mit der UDD. Die Führung der Rothemden forderte unter anderem, das Parlament innerhalb von 30 Tagen aufzulösen und Neuwahlen auszurufen. Außerdem verlangten sie eine unabhängige Untersuchung der Gewalt vom 10. April 2010. Die Regierung wies die Forderungen als unannehmbar zurück und ließ die Verhandlungen scheitern.
Abhisit Vejjajiva:"Negotiations must be done to find a solution for most of the country, not just the red shirts, who are just part of society".
http://saiyasombut.wordpress.com/2010/04/25/negotiations-between-red-shirts-and-government-failed-again/
On 24.April the Abhisit-Government started new negotiations with the UDD. The Red Shirt leadership demanded among other things the dissolution of the parliament within 30 days and new elections. Furthermore they asked for an independent inquiry of the April 10th violent crackdown. The government rejected the demands as unacceptable and allowed the negotiations to fail.
Abhisit Vejjajiva:"Negotiations must be done to find a solution for most of the country, not just the red shirts, who are just part of society".
http://saiyasombut.wordpress.com/2010/04/25/negotiations-between-red-shirts-and-government-failed-again/
Anfang Mai wusste zunächst keiner der beiden Kontrahenten, wie es weiter gehen sollte. Am 03. Mai unterbreitete die Regierung bei neuen Gesprächen der UDD ein Friedensangebot und bot Neuwahlen für den 14. November an. Außerdem verlangte sie die sofortige Beendigung der Proteste und die Auflösung der Camps. Die UDD-Führung war bereit, das Angebot anzunehmen, forderte aber einige Nachbesserungen. Die Regierung Abhisit brach daraufhin erneut die Verhandlungen ab.
Beginning of May 2010 none of the opposing parties knew how to break the deadlock. On 03.May the Abhisit-Administration submitted another so-called peace offer to the UDD leadership and offered new elections for November 14th. They also demanded the immediate termination of the protest and the clearing of the protest camps. The UDD leadership generally accepted the terms but demanded some amendments. Thereupon the Abhisit-Government cancelled again the negotiations.
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Der Chulalongkorn Hospital-Kompromiss/Compromise
On May 2nd the local police forces and the representatives of the Chulalongkorn Hospital started negotiations with the Red Shirts. They asked for the clearing of the barricade along Sala Daeng intersection because it blocked the access to the emergency department of the hospital. The protesters refused to dimantle the barricade completely but agreed to remove some of the road blocks to allow free access to the emergency department.
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| Protestler beobachten die Verhandlungen am Chulalongkorn Krankenhaus. Protesters observing the negotiations at Chulalongkorn Hospial. |
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| Ein kleiner Flirt. Flirting. |
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Die Verlagerung der Barrikade vor dem Krankenhaus.
Shifting the barricade away from the hospital.
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| Sanitäter, Ärzte, Krankenschwestern und Sicherheitspersonal des Chulalongkorn Krankenhauses schauen auf den Fernsehern im Eingangsbereich der Notfallaufnahme die Live-Berichterstattung der Thai-Medien. Paramedics, doctors, nurses and security personal of the emergency department at Chulalongkorn Hospital watching live-news of the Thai media. |
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11. bis 14. Mai/May
Barrikaden und Straßensperren
Barricades and Roadblocks
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12. Mai/May
Die gescheiterte Stromsperre
The failed power cut
Ein weiterer Versuch der Regierung (der jämmerlich scheiterte), die Bewohner des Camps an der Ratchaprasong zu demotivieren und zur Aufgabe zu zwingen, war die geplante Stromsperre. In der Nacht vom 12. auf den 13. Mai sollte den Demonstranten der Strom abgedreht werden. Hätten das CRES und die Regierung sich die Mühe gemacht, den Energieversorger vorher zu informieren anstatt den Plan über die Medien groß anzukündigen, wäre ihnen eine weitere Blamage erspart geblieben. Wie ihnen später von den Ingenieuren erklärt wurde, ist eine straßenweise Abschaltung des Stroms in Bangkok gar nicht möglich. Man könnte lediglich den Strom in dem gesamten Stadtteil abstellen und davon wären dann auch die Hotels, Büros, die noch geöffneten Geschäfte, die Anwohner und das Krankenhaus betroffen gewesen. Die Regierung ließ darauf hin den Plan stillschweigend fallen, ohne die Bevölkerung zu informieren. Und so warteten abends die Rothemden, die Hoteliers, die Geschäftsleute, die Anwohner und die Journalisten vergeblich auf die groß angekündigt Stromsperre.
Another attempt (which failed miserably) by the government to discourage the protesters and to force them to surrender was to cut the protest camps power supply. The Abhisit-administration planned to shut down the electricity during the night hours from 12. to 13. May.
If the CRES and the government would have took the trouble to catch up with the topic and would have talked to the energy provider in advance, they could have avoid themselves another embarrassment.
Instead the engineers in charge learned from the newspapers about the planned power cut. The operators had to explain to the government and the CRES that it is impossible to shut down the electricity just in the area occupied by the protesters. A shutdown would affect the whole district including shopping malls, offices, hotels and hospitals.
Thereupon the Abhisit-Government dropped the plan without informing the public and therefore shop-owners, protesters, hotelier, residents and journalists waited in vain for the widely announced power cut.
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| 23.32 Uhr, warten auf die Stromsperre. 23.32 pm, waiting for the power cut. |
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| 23.47 Uhr, immer noch warten auf die Stromsperre. 23.47, still waiting for the power cut. |
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| 23.58 Uhr: Richtig! Warten auf die Stromsperre. 23.58 pm: Exactly! Waiting for the power cut. |
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| 00.03 Uhr, die Stromsperre ist ausgefallen - schlafen gehen 00.03 pm, the power cut had been cancelled - time for a nap. |
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13. Mai/May
Die Ermordung des roten Kommandeurs (Seh Daeng - เสธ แดง ) und erneute Eskalation der Gewalt
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| Seh Daeng während seines letzten Interviews am 13.05.2010, kurz vor dem Attentat. Seh Daeng giving his last interview on May 13th 2010, just minutes before he was assassinated. |
May 13. 2010: In the evening the "Red Commander", Major-General Khattiya Sawasdipol, was shot in the head while giving an interview to foreign journalists. He succumbed to his injuries four days later, aged 58.
Er verglich sich selbst immer gerne mit dem "Freiheitskämpfer William Wallace" aus dem Film "Braveheart".
He loved to compare himself with the freedom fighter "William Wallace" from the movie "Braveheart".
One of his last interviews(given on May 13th) can be found at the end of this blog.
(English-language only)
Bereits im Januar 2010 war er wegen seiner Unterstützung für die UDD vom Dienst suspendiert worden. Geliebt und verehrt wurde und wird er bis heute von vielen Rothemden wegen seines bedingungslosen Einsatzes für die Bewegung und weil er alle Menschen gleich behandelte; für ihn habe es keine gesellschaftlichen Unterschiede gegeben, sagte eine Rothemden-Demonstrantin: "Für uns ist er ein Held". Das unterschied ihn von vielen Anhängern der PAD/Gelbhemden, die den Wert eines Menschen über seine Stellung innerhalb der Gesellschaft bzw. über seinen Wohlstand definieren. Zu seiner Tochter Khattiyah hatte er ein enges, liebevolles Verhältnis. Berüchtigt war der "Rote Kommandeur" andererseits für sein loses Mundwerk und seinen "Handgranaten-Tanz". Als er wegen "herablassender" Äußerungen gegenüber einem Vorgesetzten im Jahr 2008 strafversetzt wurde und "Aerobic-Kurse" auf einem Marktplatz geben sollte, sagte er in einem Interview: "Ich habe einen Tanz vorbereitet! Er heißt: Eine-Handgranate-Werfen-Tanz".
Und über seine Tochter sagte er in einem Interview zu dem Online-Magazin Schönes Thailand:
... Vielmehr würde uns interessieren, was aus Ihrer Tochter geworden ist. Die war 2008 doch bei den Gelbhemden. Wie ist das Verhältnis zu ihrem Vater heute?
SD: Ach das ist so eine Sache. Da war wohl die Liebe im Spiel. Aber am Ende hat der Verstand gesiegt, schließlich hat meine Tochter zwei Master in Recht, einen von einer angesehenen Universität in Europa.
MT: Was macht ihre Tochter mit einem so umstrittenen Vater?
SD: (lacht) Ich befürchte sie kommt mir sehr nahe. Sie hätte alle Qualifikationen um Richter zu werden, aber wir haben uns entschlossen, dass sie nur als Anwalt arbeiten sollte. Dieses System ist derzeit nicht dazu geeignet … Nun außerdem will meine Tochter Spitzenlistenkandidatin in der Khattiyatham Party werden. Sie meint, sie müsste mich vor mich selbst beschützen (lacht). Dabei ist sie selbst auch nicht gerade ein schwacher Charakter...
http://www.schoenes-thailand.de/startseite/analysen/5330-interview-mit-seh-daeng
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Wer das Attentat angeordnet und wer es ausgeführt hat, ist bis heute nicht geklärt. Allerdings liegt die Vermutung nahe, dass das CRES und das militärische Oberkommando für die Planung und Ausführung verantwortlich sind. Das erste Indiz ist die Präzision, mit der das Attentat ausgeführt wurde. Es gibt nicht viele Scharfschützen in Thailand, die dazu fähig sind. Und diese Handvoll Scharfschützen gehören allesamt einer Elite-Einheit der thailändischen Armee an. Der zweite Hinweis ist die Aussage des Militärsprechers Sansern Kaewkumnerd, der wenige Tage vor der Ermordung Seh Daengs öffentlich erklärte, dass eine Einheit Scharfschützen, ausgestattet mit scharfer Munition, auf dem Weg sei. Und das dritte Indiz ist die Aussage der TRCT´s (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Thailand), die auf Grund der Flugbahn des Geschosses und der verwendeten Munition zu der Schlussfolgerung gelangte, dass der Schuss von einem der umliegenden Hochhäuser abgefeuert wurde. Alle Häuser befanden sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt unter Kontrolle der Armee. Das sichergestellte Projektil gehört zu der von der Armee verwendeten Munition.
http://yanawa.blogspot.com/2012/09/the-truth-for-reconciliation-commission.html
Eines der letzten Interviews vor der Ermordung Khattiya Sawadipols findet ihr hier am Ende dieses Blogs.
Nachdem sich die Nachricht vom Attentat auf den "Roten Kommandeur" wie ein Lauffeuer verbreitete, kam es in Bangkok zu Protesten und Ausbrüchen von Gewalt, und zwar sowohl von Seiten der Rothemden als auch von deren Gegnern. Die Regierung dehnte den Ausnahmezustand auf 15 weitere Provinzen aus. In Bangkok folgten weitere Auseinandersetzungen zwischen UDD-Anhängern und Soldaten. Schüsse waren die ganze Nacht hindurch zu hören, vereinzelt wurden Granaten abgefeuert. Die Armee setzte jetzt auch scharfe Munition gegen die Demonstranten ein, und die von den Rothemden besetzte Zone wurde vollständig abgeriegelt. Mindestens ein Mensch starb in dieser Nacht und viele wurden verletzt.
After the news of the assassination attempt on the "Red Commander" were spreading like wildfire, protests broke out all over Bangkok. There were also numerous outbreaks of violence, instigated by the Red Shirts as well as by their opponents. The government extended the state of emergency to 15 other provinces. In Bangkok UDD supporters clashed with soldiers. Shots were heard throughout the night, grenades were fired sporadically. The army now used live ammunition against the demonstrators and the area occupied by the Red Shirts was completely sealed off. At least one person died that night and many more were injured.
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The taxidriver (image above) had been arrested by soldiers after he tried to escape a crowd of hooligans who claimed to be members of the Silom Lover Group. First the "SLG-supporters" had stopped his taxi and then tried to drag him out his car (there are bloodstains clearly visible on his t-shirt). Thereupon he accelerated, breached the crowd of violent rioters and tried to escape. The soldiers stopped him by firing warning shots into the air and after a short interrogation they lead him away. Interestingly they let escape the mob scot-free.
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Hundreds of UDD-supporters gathered at the Rama IV/Sathorn intersection, only a few hundred meters away from the spot where "Seh Daeng" got shot in the head. Military busses were stopped, set on fire and used as barricades.
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At 0.00 AM dozens of protesters attacked two army trucks equipped with water canons at Sathorn Road. Thanks to the brave and quick intervention of some moderate demonstrators the drivers and soldiers could escape unharmed.
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14. Mai/May
Kämpfe entlang der Rama IV
Street fights along Rama IV road.
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Die Soldaten gaben den Frauen und Kindern im Camp eine letzte Frist, das Lager an der Ratchaprasong zu verlassen und sich in Sicherheit zu begeben. Die Regierung hatte für den 15. Mai 2010 den Schießbefehl ausgegeben. Das Camp wurde abgeriegelt und der Bereich zur sogenannten "LIVE-FIRE-ZONE" erklärt. Im Klartext: Die Soldaten durften ohne Vorwarnung das Feuer auf Demonstranten, Zivilisten und Journalisten mit scharfer Munition eröffnen.
The soldiers offered a final deadline to women and children inside the camp to leave the occupied area and get themselves to safety. On May 15 the Abhisit-Government officially gave the shooting order. The camp was cordoned off and the occupied area was declared a "LIVE-FIRE-ZONE". In plain language: The soldiers were allowed to shoot at protesters, civilians and journalists without prior warning.
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A guard was sending a signal to the soldiers that unarmed civilians are going to leave the camp.
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Only a small number of women left the camp. Mostly elderly ladies who were not able to run anymore.
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Demonstranten beobachten die Bewegungen der Armee.
Demonstrators observing the movements of the soldiers.
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Soldiers and protesters were exchanging gunfire along the Lumpini Park .
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Stand-Off in der Nähe der Bon Kai-Brücke.
Stand-off near Bon Kai-bridge.
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Soldiers firing with live ammunition on protesters on the other side of the burning barricades.
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Arrested protesters were lead away and locked up until they were removed by the army.
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Interview mit Khattiya Sawasdipol
Khattiya Sawasdipol's interview
Thailand: Interview - Maj Gen Khattiya Sawasdipol, Anti-Government Activist.
Thai Press Reports | May 14, 2010 |
Section: General News - Suspended Army specialist Maj General Khattiya Sawasdipol on May 13 gave an interview to The Nation's Pongphon Sarnsamak, not long before he was shot in the head. He is still in critical condition, The Nation reports.
The 13-minute and 16-second interview is given near an MRT station beside the statue of King Rama VI at Lumpini Park.
Q : The crackdown on the demonstrators will take place tonight [last night]? K : My guess is that they won't do it during night time. They would do it at dawn - as a military doctrine says an offensive should be carried out at dawn.
Q : Then how possible is that it will be carried out at dawn? K : It depends. We all have empty hands. Let's see if they are crazy enough to do it. The whole world and the world media are watching whether the soldiers are crazy enough.
Q : If you think a cracdown is possible at dawn, don't you have any plans? K : I don't know about the red masses. I don't get involved with their fighting, which will be unconventional. I won't be a part of their fight. I only walk around the protest site to give them moral support. I don't know how they will fight.
Q : The armed men in black will emerge this time? K : They will. The same guys. They will show up to justify [the government's actions]. They walk around carrying guns. They are the government's men that showed up on April 10. They are showing off for foreign media cameras.
Q : How possible will there be torching of shopping malls near the protest site? K : Nothing. This is not discussed.
Q : How many men are under your command? K : There is none. It's just me. I have never seen anyone carrying weapons here. They are armed with only morale and will power. I don't know where the unidentified force come from.
Q : Regarding your coming speech, who will you address it to? K : To the red guards.
Q : The guards are under your command? K : No. They are from the provinces, and now work together.
Q : And what about the King Taksin Force that you trained? K : That was over two years ago. The force disbanded itself. The red guards you see now travel to Bangkok along with the protestors from 75 provinces. They come and work together.
Q : What is your view on infighting among the red-shirt leadership? A : The "dove" leaders took money from the government and the "hawk" leaders want to expose them, but they don't dare to. But the "hawk" leaders have me, so I expose the "dove leaders".
Q : Who are the dove leaders? K : Nattawut Saikua, Jatuporn Promphan, Dr Weng Tojirakarn, and Wisa Khanthap.
Q : Who are the hawk leaders? K : Arisman Pongruangrong, Suporn Atthawong, Khwanchai Praipana and Payap Panket.
Q : Your are not included? K : I don't get involved with the protest.
Q : You are not a hardcore? K : No. I work separately from the leaders. I don't speak on the stage. I work on the security for the protest. The leaders want me out, but I'm not leaving. I will take care of the protesters, because I know they will be killed if I leave.
Q : The infighting will weaken the protest? K : No. The doves are bad leaders. The red shirts have come to fight and die. How can they make a deal [with the government] for themselves? The prime minister's road map, the surrender of Suthep Thaugsuban at the DSI, and at the CSD. I exposed them all. The red shirts have come here for House dissolution, not for the road map.
Q : What do you have to explain to the people about the red shirts' demand? K : We come here for House dissolution and now we are fooled by the first-tier leaders. Now we are waiting for the second-tier leaders, who have now given a pledge to carry on the protest and now one backs out. Arisman is the leader.
It is not certain if Jatuporn will join the bandwagon. He jumped in and just jumped out.
Q : How many men are still with you if the protest is over, or if the doves give up? K : Everyone will stay, because the essentials are all here - water, food, tents, generators and mobile toilets.
Q : If Suthep surrenders to CSD, the protest is over? A : As agreed. No one will give up. They are ready for a revolution. The hawks are ready to do it since Wednesday night. Arisman announced openly to bring back the 1997 Constitution and Thaksin.
Q : What do you think about the protest continuing and the demand for the prime minister's resignation? K : I don't know. The fighting is going on. The prime minister has the aristocracy, the military and the police behind him. He can go on fighting.
Q : Where is Veera Musigapong? K : He is gone.
Q : Gone where? He is not well? K : To the UK. The red-shirted leaders are embarrassed [over Veera giving up], because I revealed all.
Q : When did Veera leave Thailand? K : Three days ago, because I revealed the infighting. The prime minister got angry with me over the road map, because they could not reach an agreement.
Q : Who are the real powers among the red-shirted leaders? K : They were all real powers, initially. But now some of them have shown their true selves, as money can buy everything, or some big people have influenced [their change of mind].
It's like a rigged boxing bout after all. But everything got stuck because of me telling the truth. That is why Abhisit and Suthep are angry at me.
Q : How many are real powers are left? K : None. The leaders' influence is so much that their guards can beat up anyone. But Arisman is not afraid of them.
Q : You don't want to be a red leader? K : Unsuitable. I am a soldier and responsible for security for the protest. This is enough to drive me crazy. I will become weaker in combat if I take two jobs. I can speak on the stage if permitted but I cannot go and attend meetings with them, or the border protest site will be a mess.
Q : Why is there now a military presence? K : It happened after the deal was made [to pressure noncooperative leaders]. Some people say the deal was not fully successful because I stood in the way. Some try to find out why it is so difficult to kill me, even though I am unarmed and travel alone.
Q : Why can't they catch you? K : Who would dare to come in here? Would you dare if ordered to catch me? Q : What about when you are outside? K : I don't go outside. I stay within the protest areas. It's like a spy movie if you imagine about them infiltrating among red shirts and taking me.
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Ende des fünften Teils.
Links:
Die Rothemden-Proteste - Teil 1: Prolog und März 2010 - Phan Fa-Brücke
Die Rothemden-Proteste - Teil 2: 01. - 17. April - die gescheiterte Niederschlagung
Die Rothemden-Proteste - Teil 3: 18. - 20. April - die Barrikade und der Aufmarsch der Sicherheitskräfte
Die Rothemden-Proteste - Teil 4: 21. - 30. April - die Herrschaft des Mobs
English versions:
A personal diary - Part 1: Prologue and March 2010
A personal diary - Part 2: 1. - 17. April 2010
The Red Shirt protests - Part 3: 18. - 20. April 2010 - the barricade and the arrival of the security forces
The Red Shirt protests - Part 4: 21. - 30. April 2010 - Mob Rules
Die Rothemden-Proteste - Teil 5: 01. - 14. Mai - grausamer Mai/ "Cruel May" - พฤษภาอำมหิต- Teil/Part 1 - (German Version, only English captions and some English text translations)
The Red Shirt protests - Part 6: 15. - 18. Mai - "Cruel May" - พฤษภาอำมหิต - Part 2
The Red Shirt Protests - Part 7: May 19 - the crackdown
The Red Shirt protests - Part 8: 21. May 2010 - after the crackdown
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